Subject-Matter Index

Alderney

personal actions

6-year prescription period for personal actions: Leopard v. NFU Mutual Ins. Socy. Ltd. (Royal Ct.), 2022 GLR 79

Leopard v. NFU Mutual Ins. Socy. Ltd. (C.A.), 2022 GLR 412

Contract actions

empêchement d’agir

empêchement d’agir (defence that practically impossible to commence or continue proceedings sooner) applicable to contractual claims: Holdright Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Willis Corroon Management (Guernsey) Ltd. (Royal Ct.), 2000–02 GLR 60

running of time

cause of action accrues when breach of contract occurs—action prescribed if not commenced within 6 years, pursuant to Loi relative aux Prescriptions 1889, art. 1: Stefani v. Le Pelley (Royal Ct.), 1997–99 GLR 271

prescription period runs from date of breach: Holdright Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Willis Corroon Management (Guernsey) Ltd. (Royal Ct.), 2000–02 GLR 60

Criminal prescription

operation of customary law

customary law of criminal prescription now in disuse—originally 20 years for serious “public crimes,” and year and day for “minor crimes” (frequently causes en adjonction giving rise to both criminal and civil consequences)—abolition of civil aspects of causes en adjonction caused prescription of criminal aspect to lapse: Bach v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2007–08 GLR 354

role of court

if no statutory prescription period specified for prosecution of offences in statutory regime, court unable to create one: Bach v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2007–08 GLR 354

Customary law prescription. See Criminal prescription—operation of customary law. Extinction of rights—servitudes

Effect of prescription

contrast with péremption

successful plea of prescription extinguishes cause of action completely—if action périmée, action survives but remedy barred: Ogier v. Grand Havre Holdings Ltd. (Royal Ct.), 2005–06 GLR N [29]

Empêchement d’agir. See Running of time—suspension of prescription period

Extinction of rights

servitudes

servitude continue not extinguished under customary law by non-use since continues to exist without active use, e.g. right to a view—in case of servitude discontinue (requiring positive action to keep in existence, e.g. right of way), servient landowner to show prima facie case of non-exercise during customary prescription period of 20 years and burden then shifts to dominant landowner to show use and therefore non-extinction: Duquemin v. Dunstan Invs. Ltd. (Royal Ct.), 2003–04 GLR 537

Foreign limitation period. See CIVIL PROCEDURE (Péremption)

Indecent assault. See CRIMINAL LAW (Indecent assault)

Overriding time-limits. See Running of time—extension of prescription period

Péremption. See CIVIL PROCEDURE (Péremption)

Running of time

contract. See Contract actions—running of time

extension of prescription period

court may allow hearing outside statutory time-limit of new cause of action raised by amendment if no unfair prejudice to defendant—in deciding whether equitable to override time-limit for personal injuries action (Law Reform (Tort) (Guernsey) Law 1979, s.5(4), court to consider (under s.8(3)), inter alia, length and reasons for delay (e.g. need to retain new expert witness), whether affects cogency of evidence (e.g. if substantial body of well-recorded, contemporaneous evidence) and conduct of parties: Butt v. Brannan (Royal Ct.), 2003–04 GLR N [15]

suspension of prescription period

empêchement d’agir applicable as part of Guernsey coûtume—suspends prescription in favour of plaintiff suffering impediment making it practically impossible to commence or continue action—practical impossibility a matter of reasonableness—mere ignorance not sufficient—historic examples from customary texts unreliable guide to modern standards of reasonableness: Holdright Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Willis Corroon Management (Guernsey) Ltd. (Royal Ct.), 2000–02 GLR 60

empêchement d’agir probably applicable as part of Guernsey coûtume, though boundaries uncertain—suspends prescription in favour of plaintiff suffering from impediment making it practicably impossible to discover facts or existence of cause of action—mere ignorance not itself sufficient but may be part of circumstances together amounting to impediment—unclear in Guernsey whether time begins to run when actionable damage occurs or when should reasonably have been discoverable by plaintiff: Yaddehige v. Credit Suisse Trust Ltd. (C.A.), 2007–08 GLR 282

empêchement d’agir suspends prescription in favour of plaintiff suffering impediment making it practically impossible to commence or continue action—inapplicable to contractual provision reducing time for bringing action for negligence or breach of contract: Smith v. Carey Olsen (Guernsey) LLP (Royal Ct.), 2020 GLR 236

if foreign lex causae governs structure of bringing and suspension of proceedings, also lays down prescription periods—within that framework, details of when proceedings brought and suspended laid down by Guernsey law as lex fori: Braun v. Brantridge Estates Ltd. (Royal Ct.), 2009–10 GLR 252

possibility of raising empêchement d’agir (that practically impossible to commence or continue proceedings sooner) as defence to exception de fonds justifies amendment of pleadings to add new cause of action after expiry of prescription period James v. Midland Bank Trust Corp. (Guernsey) Ltd. (Royal Ct.), 2000–02 GLR N [4]

trusts. See Trust proceedings—suspension of prescription period

tort. See Tort actions—running of time

trusts. See Trust proceedings—running of time

Servitudes. See Extinction of rights—servitudes

Suspension of prescription period. See Running of time—suspension of prescription period

Tort actions

disapplication of limitation period

action by English plaintiff against English defendant for damages for personal injuries sustained in Guernsey—defendant drove motor car (without insurance) into barrier on quay causing plaintiff to fall onto pontoon—action initially commenced in England but quay not “road” for purposes of English Road Traffic Act and reliance on English agreement with Motor Insurers’ Bureau rather than Guernsey agreement—English proceedings stayed and Guernsey action commenced outside time limit—appropriate in circumstances to disapply 3-year time limit: Brown v. Gould (C.A.), 1997–99 GLR 136

under Law Reform (Tort) (Guernsey) Law 1979, s.8, Bailiff has discretion to disapply three-year time limit in s.5—where discretion exercised by reference to legally irrelevant consideration, i.e. that Guernsey was the forum conveniens, Court of Appeal to exercise discretion: Brown v. Gould (C.A.), 1997–99 GLR 136

empêchement d’agir

empêchement d’agir (defence that practically impossible to commence or continue proceedings sooner) applicable to tort claims subject to Law Reform (Tort) (Guernsey) Law 1979, as no express or inferential intention to abolish it, but intended to increase claimant protection—empêchement serves justice and desirable that apply similar prescription principles in contract and tort—though applicable, unlikely that empêchement provides extra-statutory protection in personal injury cases: Holdright Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Willis Corroon Management (Guernsey) Ltd. (Royal Ct.), 2000–02 GLR 60

extension of limitation period

under Law Reform (Tort) (Guernsey) Law 1979, s.8, court may allow claim for injury caused by medical negligence to proceed out of time—to consider s.8 factors and strength of plaintiff’s case—court may allow application if material fact, e.g. availability of specialist to give diagnostic examination before surgery, no longer provable but claim nevertheless has slim chance of success: Mourant v. Ferguson (Royal Ct.), 2003–04 GLR N [30]

maritime collisions

two-year prescription period for maritime collision actions founded in negligence—Maritime Conventions Act 1911, s.8 not repealed by Law Reform (Tort) (Guernsey) Law 1979, s.4(1): Baron Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Le Pelley (C.A.), 1997–99 GLR 235

running of time

cause of action accrues when damage caused or plaintiff in position to sue—action prescribed if not commenced within 6 years, pursuant to Loi relative aux Prescriptions 1889, art. 1: Stefani v. Le Pelley (Royal Ct.), 1997–99 GLR 271

prescription period runs from date actionable damage occurred not from date plaintiff reasonably knew of it—although reasonable knowledge test preferable, development of customary law precluded by Law Reform (Tort) (Guernsey) Law 1979, having regard to Lord Lowry’s “aids to navigation”—statutory extensions of time based on reasonable knowledge otherwise rendered meaningless: Holdright Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Willis Corroon Management (Guernsey) Ltd. (Royal Ct.), 2000–02 GLR 60

uncertain whether under Law Reform (Tort) (Guernsey) Law 1979, s.4, date tort action accrues (and limitation period begins to run) when relevant actionable damage occurs, or when reasonably discoverable by claimant: Jefcoate v. Spread Trustee Co. Ltd. (Royal Ct.), 2013 GLR 220

Trust proceedings

knowing receipt and dishonest assistance

knowing receipt and dishonest assistance claims subject to ordinary limitation period—though defendants liable to account as constructive trustee, not trustees for purposes of Trusts (Guernsey) Law 2007, s.76: Jefcoate v. Spread Trustee Co. Ltd. (Royal Ct.), 2013 GLR 220

running of time

prescription period under Trusts (Guernsey) Law 2007, s.72(2) runs from “date on which the claimant first had knowledge of the breach” which includes knowledge reasonably discoverable: Jefcoate v. Spread Trustee Co. Ltd. (Royal Ct.), 2013 GLR 220

suspension of prescription period

under Trusts (Guernsey) Law 2007, s.72(2), prescription period runs from date of claimant’s first knowledge of breach—if trust property transferred to successor trustee, claimant not entitled to delay bringing action on basis of successor trustee’s later knowledge: Jefcoate v. Spread Trustee Co. Ltd. (Royal Ct.), 2013 GLR 220