Subject-Matter Index

Abuse of process

appeals against conviction

appeal on basis of inconsistent witness evidence only to be allowed if verdict of Jurats obviously wrong—holders of judicial office with considerable experience of criminal trials: X v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2017 GLR N [2]

principles: (a) jurisdiction more limited than English Court of Appeal (cannot set aside decision merely because “unsafe”); (b) appeal only allowed if verdict of Jurats obviously wrong—holders of judicial office with considerable experience of criminal trials; and (c) Court of Appeal to bear in mind that function of fact finding reserved to Royal Court which has advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses: X v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2017 GLR N [2]

burden of proof

decision on abuse of criminal process requires judicial assessment of legal submissions as to competing interests involved—not fact-finding matter requiring evidence to satisfy specified burden of proof: Law Officers v. Taylor (Royal Ct.), 2011–12 GLR 8

delay

(a) conviction only quashed or stay granted in exceptional circumstances; (b) rare for stay to be granted if delay not fault of complainant; (c) stay only granted if serious prejudice to defendant; (d) when assessing possible serious prejudice, judge to bear in mind his power to regulate trial; and (e) no stay if fair trial nevertheless possible—passage of time alone insufficient—proceedings for historic sexual offences fair despite speculation that documents or witnesses now unavailable: Le Page v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2017 GLR 186

delay in commencing prosecution not to be so oppressive or unconscionable as to be serious abuse of executive power—delay per se not enough to justify stay and stay not granted simply to express disapproval of prosecution’s behaviour—stay rarely granted (permanent stay almost never) in absence of fault in investigating or prosecution authorities or serious prejudice to accused—preferable for trial judge to use discretion under PPACE, s.78 to exclude evidence which would operate unfairly against accused: Taylor v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 81

delay in commencing prosecution not to be so oppressive or unconscionable as to be serious abuse of executive power—stay of proceedings rarely granted in absence of fault in investigating or prosecution authorities or serious prejudice to accused: Law Officers v. Taylor (Royal Ct.), 2011–12 GLR 8

fair trial. See Fair trial—delay

prevention of oppression

Taylor v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 81

principles to be considered

test for court intervention whether accused prejudiced and administration of justice undermined by oppressive behaviour of investigators or prosecution—prejudice necessary to accused’s defence, or threat to his human rights or rule of law—interference when court believes accused cannot receive fair trial, or believes would be unfair to try him at all: Law Officers v. Taylor (Royal Ct.), 2011–12 GLR 8

Acquittal. See Appeals—appeals against acquittal

Aggravation of sentence. See Sentence—aggravation. Sentence—sentencing principles

Appeals

appeals against acquittal

Court of Appeal may quash acquittal in Magistrate’s Court and remit for rehearing using jurisdiction of Royal Court under Magistrate’s Court (Criminal Appeals) (Guernsey) Law 1988, s.6(3): Law Officers v. Le Billon (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 128

appeals against conviction

appeal allowed if Jurats’ verdict “obviously and palpably wrong”—different from English test of whether “unsafe or unsatisfactory to uphold” it: Barnes v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2003–04 GLR 521

constitution of Royal Court

Jurats not required to sit on appeal from Magistrate’s Court when grounds of appeal are unreasonable verdict, verdict not supported by evidence, wrong decision of law, or miscarriage of justice (on ground of prosecution disclosure)—questions of law for judge sitting alone: A v. Law Officers (Royal Ct.), 2013 GLR 22

no requirement in European Convention that lay fact-finders (Jurats) required in appeals from Magistrate’s Court—hearing of appeal by legally-qualified judicial officer sitting alone proper if oral hearing, previous written arguments, reasoned decision in accordance with law, with power to uphold, quash, or remit decision to lower court: A v. Law Officers (Royal Ct.), 2013 GLR 22

on appeal from Magistrate’s Court, Bailiff sits alone unless matters of fact to be considered—miscarriage of justice (third ground of appeal in Court of Appeal (Guernsey) Law 1961, s.25(1)) not to be regarded as means of obtaining appeal with Jurats to decide matters of fact if in reality no such issues arise: Law Officers v. Blondel (Royal Ct.), 1997–99 GLR N [1]

conviction not supported by evidence. See COURTS (Court of Appeal—jurisdiction)

if case based on circumstantial evidence fit to be left to Jurats and still available for consideration by them despite defence evidence, rare for conviction to be quashed on appeal—only set aside if “obviously and palpably wrong”: Hardy v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2013 GLR 127

inconsistent evidence—conviction for unlawful wounding not overturned if complainant’s account of offence consistent, even if inconsistent evidence on peripheral matters: Jones v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2016 GLR 243

inconsistent verdicts—verdicts of not guilty of wounding with intent and guilty of unlawful wounding not inconsistent—Jurats unsure of drunk defendant’s specific intentions but sure of basic intent: Jones v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2016 GLR 243

leave required to appeal to Court of Appeal against conviction in Magistrate’s Court—appeal to be on question of law alone or with Bailiff’s certificate that sufficient grounds of appeal exist (Magistrate’s Court (Criminal Appeals) (Guernsey) Law 1988, s.7)—where no certificate granted, leave to appeal on questions of fact refused: Law Officers v. Carter (C.A.), 1997–99 GLR 102

not for Court of Appeal to make new judgment on basis of trial transcript and documents—to decide whether open to Jurats to decide charges proved beyond reasonable doubt, or whether verdict so fundamentally flawed that obviously and palpably wrong: G v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2013 GLR 190

test to allow appeal under Court of Appeal (Guernsey) Law 1961, s.25(1) whether verdict obviously and palpably wrong or not supported by evidence: Presland v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2007–08 GLR N [11]

under Court of Appeal (Guernsey) Law 1961, art. 25, court may set aside appeal against conviction if unreasonable, unsupported by evidence, wrong decision on question of law, or miscarriage of justice for any reason—jurisdiction narrower than in England, as no jurisdiction to set aside decision merely on ground that “unsafe” or about which entertains “lurking doubt”: Pinto v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2013 GLR 83

under Court of Appeal (Guernsey) Law 1961, art. 25, court may set aside appeal against conviction if unreasonable, unsupported by evidence, wrong decision on question of law, or miscarriage of justice for any reason—no jurisdiction to set aside decision merely on grounds that “unsafe,” i.e. would have reached different conclusion on facts or attached different significance to evidence before Magistrate: Guest v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2003–04 GLR N [1]

under Court of Appeal (Guernsey) Law 1961, s.25, court may set aside appeal against conviction if unreasonable, unsupported by evidence, wrong decision on question of law, or miscarriage of justice for any reason: Hastie v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2016 GLR 60

very difficult to challenge Jurats’ criminal verdicts as unreasonable, since holders of judicial office more experienced in law and procedure than ordinary jurors: Taylor v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2007–08 GLR 207

appeals against sentence. See Sentence—appeals against sentence

appeals from Royal Court. See COURTS (Royal Court—leave to appeal)

extension of time for appeal

application for extension of time to appeal against extended sentence licence refused—applicant had already appealed unsuccessfully to Court of Appeal against sentence—Court of Appeal functus officio: Hastie v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2022 GLR N [1]

application for leave to appeal out of time granted only exceptionally—refused if sentence not manifestly excessive and no substantial grounds for delay—duty to provide substantial grounds for delay increasingly onerous over time—applicant who voluntarily leaves jurisdiction to avoid serving sentence subject to even higher level of scrutiny to discourage absconding: In re Sherry (Royal Ct.), 2011–12 GLR N [12]

if delay excusable, court to consider appeal’s prospect of success before giving leave out of time—if believes that appeal bound to succeed, may grant extension and leave even if most serious delay: Fernandes v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2014 GLR N [8]

no extension of time to appeal from Magistrate’s Court or Royal Court if lengthy unexplained delay and sentence not contested as excessive—wrong to re-open merely because appellant belatedly advised that plausible ground for appeal exists: Sherry v. R. (P.C.), 2013 GLR 64

short time limit of 10 days from conviction (Court of Appeal (Guernsey) Law 1961, s.30(1)) dictated by need for certainty on part of all involved—process of initiating appeal by completing pro forma application simple and undemanding—appellant not convincing if claims that difficult to obtain legal representation (when actually represented at sentencing hearing) and procedure hard to understand: Fernandes v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2014 GLR N [8]

fresh evidence

admissible if (a) not available at trial; (b) relevant to issues; (c) well capable of belief; (d) might have raised reasonable doubt in minds of jury if given with other evidence at trial—evidence from searches on social media not admitted as had been available at trial: Le Page v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2017 GLR 186

admissible under Court of Appeal (Guernsey) Law 1961, s.32(1)(b), if not available at trial, relevant, credible and able to raise reasonable doubt of guilt taken with existing evidence—reasonable explanation to be given for not raising it below and appellant’s failure to bring known evidence to attention of his advocate not reasonable explanation: Presland v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2007–08 GLR N [11]

not admissible on appeal if available at trial but accused chose not to adduce it: Hastie v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2016 GLR 60

grounds of appeal

client’s allegation of counsel’s incompetence, affecting fairness of trial, ground for appeal against conviction—proper for Bailiff to direct inquiry into competence but for appellate court itself to decide whether incompetence made out—may call affidavit or oral evidence and allow cross-examination: G v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2013 GLR 190

in absence of detailed grounds for appeals from Juvenile Court (in Magistrate’s Court (Criminal Appeals) (Guernsey) Law 1988, s.1), grounds stated in Court of Appeal (Guernsey) Law 1961, s.25(1) to be used—verdict unreasonable or not supported by evidence, wrong decision of law, or miscarriage of justice: X v. Law Officers (Royal Ct.), 2013 GLR 265

in absence of detailed grounds in Magistrate’s Court (Criminal Appeals) (Guernsey) Law 1988, s.1, grounds stated in Court of Appeal (Guernsey) Law 1961, s.25(1) to be used—unreasonable verdict, verdict not supported by evidence, wrong decision of law, or miscarriage of justice—preclude use of English ground that verdict “unsafe or unsatisfactory”: A v. Law Officers (Royal Ct.), 2013 GLR 22

“miscarriage of justice”—no settled meaning but used to describe wide variety of circumstances in which accused treated unfairly, so that convicted when demonstrably innocent, or otherwise should not have been convicted: A v. Law Officers (Royal Ct.), 2013 GLR 22

hearing in private/public. See Hearing—hearing in private

interlocutory ruling. See Interlocutory rulings—judicial review

leave to appeal

appeal to Court of Appeal as of right under Court of Appeal (Guernsey) Law 1961, s.24(a) and no leave required if appeal on “question of law alone”—whether evidence sufficient to support conviction unlikely to be “question of law alone” as may involve additional questions of fact, becoming “question of mixed law and fact” requiring leave under s.24(b): Taylor v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2007–08 GLR 207

Court of Appeal (Guernsey) Law 1961, s.24 relating to criminal appeals of no help in interpreting s.15 dealing with civil appeals—structure of s.24 focuses on grounds of appeal but structure of s.15 on proceedings in Royal Court: Ferbrache v. C & R Homes (Guernsey) Ltd. (C.A.), 2009–10 GLR 455

extension of time for appeal. See Appeals—extension of time for appeal

point not taken in previous appeal

no extension of time to appeal from Royal Court on ground available in earlier appeal to Privy Council but not taken then—wrong to re-open out of time merely because appellant belatedly advised that plausible ground for appeal exists: Sherry v. R. (P.C.), 2013 GLR 64

time in custody before appeal. See Sentence—imprisonment

Bail

absconding on bail

sentence—conviction of failing to surrender to custody when on bail engages Royal Court of Guernsey (Miscellaneous Reform Provisions) Law 1950, s.8(1)—Jurats to be involved in sentencing and error of law for judge to conduct sentencing exercise alone—to be corrected by Court of Appeal under powers in Court of Appeal (Guernsey) Law 1961, s.25(3): Collins v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR N [14]

surety for bail

forfeiture of recognizance—Magistrate’s Court without statutory jurisdiction or procedural authority to order forfeiture—recognizance only enforceable as action for civil debt owed by surety to Crown and subject to financial limits of court’s civil jurisdiction: Law Officers v. De Jersey (Magistrate’s Ct.), 2007–08 GLR N [2]

Burden of proof. See EVIDENCE (Burden of proof)

Change of plea. See Pleas—equivocal plea

Character. See Sentence—previous good character

Charges

amendment

conviction not undermined by amendment at late stage if no injustice or prejudice caused to appellant: Bullock v. Law Officers (Royal Ct.), 2003–04 GLR N [14]

duplicity

summons defective if charges more than one offence—e.g. multiple fishing offences under Fishing (Sark) Ordinance 1996 to be separately charged, not collectively as “illegal fishing”: Law Officers v. Constables of Sark (Royal Ct.), 2003–04 GLR N [12]

joinder

sexual offences—properly joined as a series under Indictment (Guernsey) Rules 1949, r.3 if sufficient nexus between them—may be established if cross-admissibility of evidence (i.e. if evidence of one victim, about what happened to her, so related to evidence of other victim that just to admit it notwithstanding prejudice)—charges of indecent assault and rape properly joined if young victims did not know each other; both of similar age at time of offences; met offender at similar location; and groomed in similar way: Hastie v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2016 GLR 60

sexual offences—under Indictments (Guernsey) Law 1950, Schedule, r.3, charges for different offences may be joined in same indictment if founded on same facts or series of offences of similar character—legitimate to join counts of rape and sodomy, e.g. if arose out of single incident and part of uninterrupted course of conduct: Afonso v. Law Officers (Royal Ct.), 2000–02 GLR N [17]

under Indictment (Guernsey) Rules 1949, r.3, counts may be joined in same indictment if reveal “series of offences of same or similar character”—Crown to show nexus of similarities in law or facts justifying joinder—cross-admissibility of evidence supports joinder but not essential: Dodd v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2015 GLR 123

multiple offences

to contain sufficient detail of individual offences (e.g. by setting out alleged fishing offences in words of Fishing (Sark) Ordinance 1996, rather than stating “illegal fishing”) to avoid confusion as to whether offence actually committed and give proper notice of charges to accused: Law Officers v. Constables of Sark (Royal Ct.), 2003–04 GLR N [12]

under European Convention, art. 6(3), defendant to be informed in clear detail of nature and cause of accusation against him—in charge, unacceptable for several allegations to be condensed into single sentence (e.g. multiple offences under Fishing (Sark) Ordinance 1996 charged collectively as “illegal fishing”)—if lack of detail renders guilty plea unsafe, clear justification to set aside conviction and sentence: Law Officers v. Constables of Sark (Royal Ct.), 2003–04 GLR N [12]

particulars

to provide particulars necessary to give reasonable information about nature of charge—offence to be described clearly, definitely and without uncertainty—not sufficient to charge multiple offences under Fishing (Sark) Ordinance 1996 collectively as “illegal fishing”—sufficient to describe offences in terms of statute: Law Officers v. Constables of Sark (Royal Ct.), 2003–04 GLR N [12]

severance

by Indictments (Guernsey) Law 1950, s.4(3), may sever counts in same indictment if for any reason separate trials preferable—discretion of trial judge only open to challenge on appeal if considered irrelevant factors, ignored relevant ones, or decision manifestly unreasonable: Dodd v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2015 GLR 123

under Indictments (Guernsey) Law 1950, s.4(3), court has discretion to sever indictment containing charges for different offences—no miscarriage of justice if refuses to sever, e.g. because charges founded on same facts, of similar character, and part of uninterrupted course of conduct: Afonso v. Law Officers (Royal Ct.), 2000–02 GLR N [17]

Child pornography. See Sentence—aggravation. Sentence—concurrent and consecutive sentences

Closing speeches

consideration in context

closing speech by accused’s advocate, giving detailed consideration to significant features in his favour, to be considered as adding to judge’s recital of facts and evidence in directions to Jurats, and evidence itself: Rouget v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2007–08 GLR 306

Co-accused. See Sentence—co-accused. EVIDENCE (Co-accused—evidence against single co-accused)

Concurrent and consecutive sentences. See Sentence—concurrent and consecutive sentences

Conduct of trial

interventions by judge. See Fair trial—interventions by judge

right to remain silent. See Defence—duty of court to unrepresented accused

sentencing. See Sentence—sentencing information

Confessions. See EVIDENCE (Admissibility—exclusion of relevant evidence)

Confiscation order. See Proceeds of criminal conduct—confiscation order

Confrontation of witnesses. See Fair trial—confrontation of witnesses

Convictions. See Abuse of process—appeals against conviction

Counsel’s assistance to court. See Judge’s summing-up—assistance of counsel

Crown Advocate. See Prosecution case—disclosure of relevant information

Defence

accused as witness. See Defence—duty of court to unrepresented accused

accused’s role in defence

duty to assist in preparation of defence, e.g. to use reasonable diligence to bring potential evidence to attention of advocate—failure to do so when knows of its availability at trial precludes calling as fresh evidence on appeal: Presland v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2007–08 GLR N [11]

calling of witnesses. See Defence—duty of court to unrepresented accused

confrontation of witnesses. See Fair trial—confrontation of witnesses

disclosure to defence. See Prosecution case—disclosure of relevant information. EVIDENCE (Admissibility—exclusion of relevant evidence), (Privilege—public interest immunity)

duty of court to unrepresented accused

at close of prosecution case, court to inform unrepresented accused of right to give evidence, call witnesses, or stay silent—failure to do so may result in quashing conviction unless information correctly given earlier in trial and accused able to take full advantage of opportunity to put case: Burtenshaw v. Law Officers (Royal Ct.), 2011–12 GLR N [1]

fair trial. See Fair trial—counsel’s incompetence

legal representation. See Defence—duty of court to unrepresented accused

Delay. See Abuse of process—delay. Appeals—extension of time for appeal. Appeals—leave to appeal. Fair trial—delay

Deportation. See Sentence—deportation. IMMIGRATION (Deportation—deportation of offender)

Disclosure to defence. See Prosecution case—disclosure of relevant information. EVIDENCE (Admissibility—exclusion of relevant evidence), (Privilege—public interest immunity)

Disparity between sentences. See Sentence—co-accused

Drugs. See CRIMINAL LAW (Drugs)

English Sentencing Guidelines Council. See Sentence—sentencing principles

Equivocal plea. See Pleas—equivocal plea

Extended sentence licence

appeal

extended sentence licence preventive not punitive—ECHR art. 7 not engaged where offences for which applicant sentenced were committed before Criminal Justice (Supervision of Offenders) (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 2004 came into force: Hastie v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2022 GLR N [1]

Extension of time for appeal. See Appeals—extension of time for appeal

Fair trial

bias

court to decide on evidence whether, in circumstances, fair-minded, informed observer would conclude real possibility or real danger of judge’s bias—appeal judge can assume viewpoint of fair-minded, informed observer—appeal judge’s professional training and oath allow him to set aside prejudices when judging: Burton v. Law Officers (Royal Ct.), 2005–06 GLR N [31]

in Guernsey, court officers inevitably know each other professionally—recusing appeal judge because of concern of apparent bias from working relationship with court officers would cause administrative difficulty—not reason to allow judge to sit if reasonable possibility of bias: Burton v. Law Officers (Royal Ct.), 2005–06 GLR N [31]

confrontation of witnesses

no absolute right for accused physically to confront witnesses against him—European Convention, art. 6 merely gives defence proper opportunity to challenge and question witnesses against accused, even if accused not physically present: Pinto v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2013 GLR 83

constitution of Royal Court

counsel’s incompetence

if counsel’s incompetence prejudices fairness of trial, conviction to be quashed, e.g. if gives inevitably unfavourable impression of accused to Jurats—rare that incompetence sufficient to prejudice fairness of trial: Law Officers v. Holliday (C.A.), 2000–02 GLR 9

incompetence affecting fairness of trial, ground for appeal against conviction—if client alleges incompetence, proper for Bailiff to direct inquiry into it but for appellate court itself to decide whether incompetence made out—may call affidavit or oral evidence and allow cross-examination: G v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2013 GLR 190

delay

delay in commencing prosecution not to be so oppressive or unconscionable as to be serious abuse of executive power—delay per se not enough to justify stay and not granted simply to express disapproval of prosecution’s behaviour—rarely granted (permanent stay almost never) in absence of fault in investigating or prosecution authorities or serious prejudice to accused—preferable for trial judge to use discretion under PPACE, s.78 to exclude evidence unfair to accused: Taylor v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 81

likelihood of serious prejudice to fair trial by delay intrinsic to challenging trial for abuse of process—court’s role to decide whether delay impaired fairness of trial process—if no statutory prescription period for prosecution, court unable to create one: Bach v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2007–08 GLR 354

duty of court to unrepresented accused

evidential irregularities

right to fair trial under European Convention on Human Rights, art. 6 may be infringed by evidential irregularities, e.g. witness falsifying evidence (later corrected) to protect from disclosure—fair trial if factual issues not directly affected by irregularities and credibility of witness’s other evidence only marginally affected: Marsh v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2000–02 GLR 406

human rights issues. See HUMAN RIGHTS (Right to fair trial)

interventions by judge

frequent intervention in cross-examination of complainant not prejudicial to defence if necessary to persuade diffident witness to give distinct answers to questions already asked: Presland v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2007–08 GLR N [11]

principles to be considered

test for court intervention on ground of abuse of process whether accused prejudiced and administration of justice undermined by oppressive behaviour of investigators or prosecution—prejudice necessary to accused’s defence, or threat to his human rights or rule of law—interference when court believes accused cannot receive fair trial, or believes would be unfair to try him at all: Law Officers v. Taylor (Royal Ct.), 2011–12 GLR 8

professional negligence of counsel

in extreme circumstances, trial may be unfair and judgment unsafe if counsel conducts defence incompetently in significant respect—allegation of incompetence to be evident on court transcript—not enough to criticize (lack of) particular line of argument or cross-examination: Marsh v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2000–02 GLR 406

use of screens in court

Royal Court has discretion to authorize use of screens or similar devices to protect witnesses if reasonably necessary and interests of justice require it—court to consider whether use of screens proportionate response to witness’s concerns, without prejudicing accused’s right to fair trial: Pinto v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2013 GLR 83

usual to direct Jurats that use of screens commonplace in Guernsey—proper to warn that generally available to both parties and use not to reflect on either—use of screens not intended to pre-judge evidence and not to be regarded as prejudicial to accused: Pinto v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2013 GLR 83

Finality of order

reconsideration and correction

Royal Court unable to reconsider and correct own decision in criminal case simply because believes incorrect in law or otherwise unjust—decision in accordance with law as then understood not in error and nothing to correct: Sherry v. R. (P.C.), 2013 GLR 64

Forfeiture. See Sentence—forfeiture

Freezing of assets. See Proceeds of criminal conduct—freezing of assets. Proceeds of criminal conduct—money laundering

Freezing order. See Proceeds of criminal conduct—property freezing order

Fresh evidence. See Appeals—fresh evidence

Grounds of appeal. See Appeals—grounds of appeal

Guilty plea. See Pleas—equivocal plea. Sentence—mitigation

Hearing

hearing in private

in absence of rules prescribing who may be present at hearing of appeal from Juvenile Court, Royal Court may use inherent jurisdiction to choose to sit in private, permitting only presence of persons permitted to attend hearings in Juvenile Court by Criminal Justice (Children and Juvenile Court Reform) (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 2008, s.8: X v. Law Officers (Royal Ct.), 2013 GLR 265

open justice requires public hearing (by Royal Court and on appeal) of application to commit for contempt of court—burden on applicant for private hearing to show justified for compelling reasons—exceptions only if justice frustrated by public hearing, or statute requires private hearing: Tchenguiz v. Hamedani (C.A.), 2015 GLR 154

in camera proceedings. See Hearing—hearing in private

interventions by judge. See Fair trial—interventions by judge

Hospital treatment order. See Sentence—hospital treatment order

Human rights issues. See HUMAN RIGHTS

Imprisonment. See Sentence—imprisonment

indecent photographs of children. See Sentence—aggravation. Sentence—concurrent and consecutive sentences. CRIMINAL LAW (Indecent photographs of children), (Indecent photographs of children—sentence)

Institution of proceedings

decision-making process

decisions in course of criminal investigation (e.g. communications between investigating and prosecution authorities, reports on decision to prosecute) may attract public interest immunity—but prosecution to make claim to immunity and submit documentation to court for it to carry out balancing exercise between disclosure and interests of justice: Taylor v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 81

proper for investigators and prosecutors to discuss matters relating to bringing prosecution fully, frankly and in private—safeguarding public confidence promoted by limiting limitation disclosure to defence of sensitive issues discussed in relation to individuals to be prosecuted—to avoid prosecution of case becoming enmired in satellite litigation: Law Officers v. Taylor (Royal Ct.), 2011–12 GLR 8

delay. See Fair trial—delay

prescription. See PRESCRIPTION (Criminal prescription)

Interlocutory appeals. See Interlocutory rulings—judicial review

Interlocutory rulings

judicial review

interlocutory ruling of Royal Court (Full Court) in criminal trial not amenable to judicial review by Royal Court (Ordinary Court)—as would effectively involve creation of interlocutory appellate procedure, change to be made by statute and not by judicial decision: Law Officers v. Taylor (Royal Ct.), 2011–12 GLR N [2]

Interventions by judge. See Fair trial—interventions by judge

Joinder of charges. See Charges—joinder

Judge’s summing-up

assistance of counsel

judge seeking counsel’s assistance on point to be included in summing-up should prepare draft for consideration—counsel to comment to ensure draft accurately addresses point—comments to be independent of counsel’s views of correctness of court’s decision: Dodd v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2015 GLR 123

consideration in context

directions to Jurats not to be considered in isolation from judge’s recital of facts and evidence, evidence itself, and detailed consideration of significant features in favour of accused in closing speech by his advocate: Rouget v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2007–08 GLR 306

contents

to give Jurats sufficient instructions for understanding task; reference to burden of proof and roles of judge and Jurats; succinctly summary of issues of fact, evidence and arguments on both sides; detailing inferences legitimately entitled to draw from primary facts: Barnes v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2003–04 GLR 521

Turnbull direction on identification. See EVIDENCE (Identity—visual identification)

Judicial review. See Interlocutory rulings—judicial review. Sentence—deportation

Jurisdiction

extraterritorial jurisdiction. See COURTS (Royal Court—jurisdiction)

Leave to appeal. See Appeals—extension of time for appeal. Appeals—leave to appeal

Life imprisonment. See Sentence—imprisonment

Majority verdict. See Verdict—majority verdict

Mitigation of sentence. See Sentence—aggravation. Sentence—mitigation

Money laundering. See Proceeds of criminal conduct—freezing of assets. Proceeds of criminal conduct—money laundering

Mutual assistance in criminal matters. See CONFLICT OF LAWS (Assistance to foreign court—examination of documents and witnesses)

Newton hearing. See Sentence—Newton hearing

Pleading

corruption

when charging corruption contrary to Prevention of Corruption (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 2003, s.1, prosecution not required to specify whether alleged gift inducement or reward: De Kock v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2017 GLR 260

Pleas

change of plea. See Pleas—equivocal plea

equivocal plea

court may not accept equivocal plea—guilty plea equivocal if guilt not fully and freely acknowledged and confessed, e.g. if accused emotionally distressed, maintains innocence but changes plea to guilty merely to end litigation, and later indicates desire to reverse guilty plea: Hutchinson v. Law Officers (Royal Ct.), 2011–12 GLR N [25]

guilty plea prima facie confession to commission of offence, but court may not accept equivocal plea (i.e. qualified by words which, if true, indicate innocence)—if equivocal, to be entered as not guilty plea: Hutchinson v. Law Officers (Royal Ct.), 2011–12 GLR N [25]

guilty plea

duty of advocate to advise client that guilty plea, showing remorse, may result in reduced sentence—to emphasize that client not to plead guilty unless in fact committed offence charged: Hutchinson v. Law Officers (Royal Ct.), 2011–12 GLR N [25]

effect on sentence. See Sentence—mitigation

equivocal plea. See Pleas—equivocal plea

Prescription. See PRESCRIPTION (Criminal prescription)

Previous convictions. See Sentence—sentencing principles. EVIDENCE (Witnesses—credibility)

Probation. See Sentence—probation

Proceeds of criminal conduct

assisting retention. See Proceeds of criminal conduct—freezing of assets

confiscation order

confiscation scheme to be given effect in manner which complies with ECHR First Protocol, art. 1 (right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions)—where respondent’s benefit from money-laundering assessed in 2019 as £2.2m. but only £1 confiscated as realisable assets, disproportionate in 2021 to confiscate £4,276 (legitimately obtained) subsequently discovered in respondent’s bank account—Criminal Justice (Proceeds of Crime) (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 1999 does not entail reducing respondent to penury: H.M. Procureur v. Dawson-Ball (Royal Ct.), 2021 GLR N [4]

defendant stored large quantity of drugs for 1 month but claimed only small quantity was his reward for doing so—for purposes of confiscation order, defendant considered to have benefited from entire amount—drugs under his control for longer than mere custodianship: Law Officers v. Robilliard (Royal Ct.), 2017 GLR N [11]

no confiscation order unless trafficked goods “obtained” by offender—courier or custodian unlikely to “obtain” goods, since requires ownership with power of disposition or control: In re Butler (Royal Ct.), 2015 GLR N [2]

prosecution to prove on balance of probabilities that relevant expenditure to trigger assumption in Drug Trafficking (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 2000, s.4(3)(b) that defendant’s expenditure in 6-year period prior to institution of proceedings met from proceeds of trafficking: Gilbert v. Law Officers (Royal Ct.), 2005–06 GLR N [30]

under Court of Appeal (Guernsey) Law 1961, s.24, “sentence” includes confiscation order made under Drug Trafficking (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 2000 and appeal therefore lies against confiscation order: Gilbert v. Law Officers (Royal Ct.), 2005–06 GLR N [30]

under Drug Trafficking (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 2000, s.4(3)(b), court may infer expenditure equal to street value of drugs in defendant’s possession—“any expenditure” may embrace “virtuous” expenditure, e.g. mortgage repayments, household bills and child maintenance—defendant may establish that such payments met from legitimate income sources: Gilbert v. Law Officers (Royal Ct.), 2005–06 GLR N [30]

forfeiture. See CIVIL PROCEDURE (Proceeds of unlawful conduct—forfeiture)

forfeiture order

account holder’s application under Forfeiture of Money, etc in Civil Proceedings (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 2007, s.11 for release of funds subject to freezing order superseded by application by H.M. Comptroller for forfeiture order under s.13—H.M. Comptroller to exercise powers compatibly with account holder’s ECHR rights—challenge to exercise of powers to be brought by judicial review: Fidelity Management Ltd. v. H.M. Comptroller (C.A.), 2024 GLR 219

freezing of assets

in private law action by beneficiary challenging trustee’s refusal to release funds after suspicious transaction report and no consent by law enforcement, burden on trustee to prove on balance of probabilities holds requisite suspicion, and then on beneficiary to prove provenance of funds: Liang v. RBC Trustees (Guernsey) Ltd. (Royal Ct.), 2018 GLR 189

refusal by FIS to give consent to dealing with funds under Criminal Justice (Proceeds of Crime) (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 1999, s.39(3) may have practical effect of informally freezing assets without judicial oversight, but not accurate characterization of legislation—assets effectively frozen by ordinary operation of criminal law as parties unwilling to transfer assets for fear of criminal liability if FIS refuses consent: Customs & Excise, Immigration & Nationality Service (Chief Officer) v. Garnet Invs. Ltd. (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 250

unofficial freezing of assets if trustee unwilling to transfer them for fear of criminal liability if law enforcement refuses consent—beneficiary may obtain relief by questioning whether trustee has requisite suspicion, or by proving provenance of assets: Liang v. RBC Trustees (Guernsey) Ltd. (Royal Ct.), 2018 GLR 189

unofficial freezing of assets of foreign company under Criminal Justice (Proceeds of Crime) (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 1999 by failure of Financial Intelligence Service to consent to transfer may be lifted on application to Royal Court—appropriate if assets held in Guernsey registered bank and account governed by Guernsey law: Fidelity Management Ltd. v. Royal Bank of Canada (C.I.) Ltd. (Royal Ct.), 2007–08 GLR N [14]

unofficial freezing of assets under Criminal Justice (Proceeds of Crime) (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 1999—if lifting of unofficial freeze would place assets at risk of dissipation, to detriment of later proprietary claims, stronger case for making and continuation of formal freezing order to ensure assets available to meet judgments on possible proprietary claims: Garnet Invs. Ltd. v. BNP Paribas (Suisse) S.A. (Royal Ct.), 2007–08 GLR 73

money laundering

anti-money laundering procedures under English Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 not adopted in Guernsey—significant differences between English and Guernsey financial services industries—Guernsey’s limited regulatory resources require tighter controls on dealing with funds under Criminal Justice (Proceeds of Crime) (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 1999, s.39(3): Customs & Excise, Immigration & Nationality Service (Chief Officer) v. Garnet Invs. Ltd. (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 250

if bank makes suspicious activity report and FIU refuses to consent to bank dealing with assets, customer’s private action against bank more appropriate method to challenge bank’s refusal to release funds than judicial review of FIU’s decision—action not struck out merely because bank’s suspicion reasonable—trial to determine provenance of funds: Jakob Intl. Inc. v. HSBC Private Bank (C.I.) Ltd. (Royal Ct.), 2016 GLR N [6]

no general duty on FIS to give reasons for refusing consent to dealing with funds under Criminal Justice (Proceeds of Crime) (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 1999, s.39(3), since may risk revealing sensitive information about inquiries to suspects—in interest of public policy to give reasons if able to do so without frustrating inquiry, but failure to give reasons in such a case not procedural impropriety: Customs & Excise, Immigration & Nationality Service (Chief Officer) v. Garnet Invs. Ltd. (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 250

no improper delay in prosecution in Guernsey if authorities wait until predicate offender and associates convicted in England and contested confiscation proceedings concluded—delay simply not to be so oppressive or unconscionable as to be serious abuse of executive power: Taylor v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 81

no prosecution before predicate crime established by conviction of offender—delay in commencing money-laundering prosecution after conviction of predicate offender not to be so oppressive or unconscionable as to be serious abuse of executive power—stay of proceedings rarely granted in absence of fault in investigating or prosecution authorities or serious prejudice to accused: Law Officers v. Taylor (Royal Ct.), 2011–12 GLR 8

no time-limit to be implied into consent regime under Criminal Justice (Proceeds of Crime) (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 1999, s.39(3), since Guernsey’s regulatory resources and powers limited—given industry’s focus on offshore transactions, significant time often required to investigate foreign sources of funds and justified in order to maintain reputation and prevent money laundering: Customs & Excise, Immigration & Nationality Service (Chief Officer) v. Garnet Invs. Ltd. (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 250

power of FIS to refuse consent to dealing with funds under Criminal Justice (Proceeds of Crime) (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 1999, s.39(3) intended to be of broad application to assist prevention of money laundering—suspicion about source of funds sufficient for relevant authority or financial institution to refuse consent until suspicions allayed: Customs & Excise, Immigration & Nationality Service (Chief Officer) v. Garnet Invs. Ltd. (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 250

refusal to consent to dealing with funds under Criminal Justice (Proceeds of Crime) (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 1999, s.39(3) is control proportionate to aim of preventing money laundering—broad application of consent regime necessary given nature of Guernsey financial services industry and lack of regulatory resources: Customs & Excise, Immigration & Nationality Service (Chief Officer) v. Garnet Invs. Ltd. (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 250

sentence

aggravation—sentence for money laundering offence aggravated by conducting unlicensed fiduciary activities, since regulatory oversight of GFSC thereby thwarted: Doyle v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2015 GLR 370

detailed reasons given why English Sentencing Council’s Guideline for money laundering unsuitable for Guernsey—most importantly, assessment of harm not merely financial—difference between jurisdictions means greater direct adverse consequences for Guernsey’s reputation, business and whole community—deterrent sentencing more effective in small community: Doyle v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2015 GLR 370

individual offender’s personal culpability most important consideration in sentencing for money laundering—detailed list of factors to be considered in assessing personal culpability: Doyle v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2015 GLR 370

scale of financial benefits to both predicate offender and money launderer justify significant sentence—important to maintain reputation of probity of Guernsey’s financial sector—in absence of special circumstances, custodial sentence always appropriate for money laundering: Taylor v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 81

property freezing order

restraint order

costs—consideration of foreign application for restraint order civil in nature, even though arises out of foreign criminal proceedings—costs therefore awarded as in civil case in discretion of court and likely to “follow event”—may be awarded against H.M. Procureur if seeks restraint order wider than requested by foreign authorities and prima facie outside court’s jurisdiction: King v. H.M. Procureur (Royal Ct.), 2011–12 GLR 285

court has no power to make in personam order against Guernsey-resident trustee requiring him to apply restraint order to trust property outside territorial limits of Guernsey envisaged by Criminal Justice (Proceeds of Crime) (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 1999, Part I: King v. H.M. Procureur (Royal Ct.), 2011–12 GLR 285

multiple applications to different jurisdictions—application to be limited to restraint of property within single jurisdiction and replicated in other jurisdictions in which restraint sought—possible confusion and conflict between orders in different jurisdictions if application made for restraint on extra-territorial basis: King v. H.M. Procureur (Royal Ct.), 2011–12 GLR 285

procedure—proper to make application ex parte with hearing in chambers—full record of proceedings to be made to enable court hearing inter partes proceedings to ascertain arguments on ex parte application: King v. H.M. Procureur (Royal Ct.), 2011–12 GLR 285

restraint order of Royal Court under Criminal Justice (Proceeds of Crime) (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 1999, Part I to be restricted to property in and enforcement of orders within Guernsey, including beneficial interests in Guernsey property under Guernsey trust—plain and natural words of Part I preclude application of extended territorial definition of “property” in s.50: King v. H.M. Procureur (Royal Ct.), 2011–12 GLR 285

Prosecution case

assembling evidence

prosecution to assemble material to be subject of prosecution for child pornography—to obtain agreement of defence if possible but, if put before court for decision, defence to have opportunity to challenge unrepresentative nature of material, or any other matter: Wicks v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 482

disclosure of relevant information

court prepared to accept assurance of responsible Crown Advocate that duties of search and disclosure carried out carefully and conscientiously—no justification for calling Crown Advocate as witness for cross-examination to assure court that duties properly carried out: Taylor v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 81

duty of prosecution to assess materiality of documents or information to be disclosed to defence—material if relevant to issue in case, would raise new issue not already apparent, or provides leads to new evidence—prosecution to conduct assessment and only submit to court information already sifted and found material: Law Officers v. Taylor (Royal Ct.), 2011–12 GLR 8

duty of prosecution to disclose unused material if helps to undermine or weaken prosecution case or assist defence—to be directly relevant to proof of case and immediately admissible, not merely designed to lead to further investigation, e.g. to test complainant’s credibility or enable cross-examination—prosecution not obliged to search detailed transcripts or probation reports to find additional details for disclosure—impracticable and undesirable to impose extra delays on prosecution: A v. Law Officers (Royal Ct.), 2013 GLR 22

duty of prosecution to disclose unused material if helps to undermine or weaken prosecution case or assist defence case—strict test for admissibility of material emanating from third parties—to be directly relevant to proof of case and immediately admissible, not merely designed to lead to further investigation, e.g. if evidence requested simply to be used for testing complainant’s credibility, need not be disclosed: Law Officers v. Alvarez (Royal Ct.), 2011–12 GLR N [28]

duty of prosecution to disclose unused material reasonably capable of undermining or weakening prosecution case or assisting defence case—not obliged to disclose material either neutral or adverse to defence: Taylor v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 81

English authorities and guidance on disclosure not binding in Guernsey—highly persuasive and should be followed by Guernsey courts because of considerable experience in England of complex disclosure matters: Law Officers v. Taylor (Royal Ct.), 2011–12 GLR 8

older English common law rules on disclosure of unused material to defence by prosecution not binding—Guernsey courts to follow more modern English decisions on common law as modified by statute, establishing fair test devised after dangers of non-disclosure became more obvious: Taylor v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 81

previously undisclosed information relevant if has impact on conduct of defence or undermines prosecution case—duty to disclose then arises: Law Officers v. Taylor (Royal Ct.), 2011–12 GLR 8

relevant evidence may attract public interest immunity, e.g. because identifies informer or person assisting police—prosecution to apply to exclude evidence in presence of defendant’s advocate if issue can be discussed without material evidence being disclosed: Marsh v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2000–02 GLR 406

whether non-disclosure amounts to “miscarriage of justice” is question of law to be determined on appeal by judge alone, not Jurats: A v. Law Officers (Royal Ct.), 2013 GLR 22

Reception of English law. See JURISPRUDENCE (Reception of English law), (Reception of English law—criminal procedure)

Rehabilitation of offenders

spent convictions

offender sentenced for offences under Protection of Children (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 1985 to 3 months’ imprisonment and 2 year extended licence period has 27-month sentence of imprisonment (Criminal Justice (Supervision of Offenders) (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 2004, s.3) for purposes of Rehabilitation of Offenders (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 2002—rehabilitation period therefore 10 years: Sahara City Co. Ltd. v. Chiverton (Royal Ct.), 2019 GLR N [4]

Remand in custody. See Sentence—imprisonment

Right to remain silent. See Defence—duty of court to unrepresented accused

Robbery. See Sentence—sentencing principles. CRIMINAL LAW (Robbery)

Sentence

absconding on bail. See Bail—absconding on bail

adoption of English sentencing practices. See CRIMINAL LAW (Indecent photographs of children—sentence)

aggravation

abuse of trust. See CRIMINAL LAW (Abuse of trust—sentence)

assault on police with firearm—aggravation by preparation and premeditation, occurring at night in street, length of time before weapon surrendered, officer’s justified fear of death or serious injury, accused expressed intention that police shoot him: Granger v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2014 GLR N [9]

attempted murder—aggravating factors include premeditation, aggression, use of knife and lasting mental impact on victim: Jones v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 471

burglary—aggravated if violent struggle on arrest and defendant uncooperative at interview: Duncombe v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR N [8]

child pornography

“initial figure” selected under Wicks guidelines subject to increase for aggravating factors—doubling initial figure for aggravation at outer limits of permissible uplift and any higher multiplier beyond spirit of guidelines: Le Gallez v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2013 GLR N [2]

lesser offence of same nature may be aggravation increasing initial figure for sentencing for principal offence even though also separately charged: Le Gallez v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2013 GLR N [2]

drug offences

elaborate degree of concealment of drugs imported in petrol tank of car is aggravating factor: Kelly v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2015 GLR 234

involving younger person in commission of offence may be aggravation: Law Officers v. Ingram (Royal Ct.), 2005–06 GLR 194

large quantity of cannabis cultivated is aggravation if suggests not for personal use but that offender is dealer—scale of increase of available stock of drugs in Island important sentencing consideration: Marsh v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2007–08 GLR 1

method of concealment of small quantity of drugs imported for personal use may be aggravating factor: Woodford v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2003–04 GLR N [3]

mitigation

evidence other than defendant’s normally required to support mistaken belief or honest ignorance as to nature, quantity or class of drugs imported—no need for Newton hearing if explanation offered rejected as beyond court’s belief: Kelly v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2015 GLR 234

mistaken belief or honest ignorance as to nature, quantity or class of drugs imported not normally mitigating factor—“exceptional circumstances” considered: Kelly v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2015 GLR 234

rape

aggravating factors listed: Burton v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 438

aggravation of rape if lasting psychological consequences for victim, e.g. ongoing fear of men and avoidance of contact, deterioration in relationship with partner, and if serious violation of personal security, e.g. stranger violating security of victim’s bedroom—entry with intent to rape or commit other crime not necessary for aggravation: Barnes v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2003–04 GLR 521

aggravation of rape provided by youth of victim and accused’s previous criminal record of sex offence against boy—justifies sentence near starting point and extended sentence licence: Presland v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2007–08 GLR N [11]

robbery—aggravated if involves violent force, knife and injury to victim and offender has previous criminal convictions: Bryant v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR N [11]

sentencing. See Sentence—sentencing principles

appeals against sentence

all related matters presented by appellant as part of appeal against sentence, including recommendation for deportation, to be determined according to same criteria as for sentence itself, i.e. whether manifestly excessive or wrong in principle: de Sousa v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2014 GLR 107

appeal against recommendation for deportation to be decided according to usual criteria for appeals against sentence, i.e. whether manifestly excessive or wrong in principle: Fernandes v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2014 GLR N [8]

as forfeiture order part of sentence, terms to be considered to decide whether make sentence “manifestly excessive”—failure to require return to offender of non-criminal data on computer forfeited under Police Property and Forfeiture (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 2006, s.3, may make overall sentence “manifestly excessive” if has financially adverse effect on him under s.3(5): Wright v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR N [9]

Court of Appeal has no power to intervene in sentence where original conviction before Magistrate’s Court: Law Officers v. Carter (C.A.), 1997–99 GLR 102

delay—no extension of time to appeal from Magistrate’s Court if lengthy unexplained delay and sentence not contested as excessive—wrong to re-open merely because appellant belatedly advised that plausible ground for appeal exists: Sherry v. R. (P.C.), 2013 GLR 64

departing from English Sentencing Guidelines Council’s guidelines in determining sentence not ground of appeal unless sentence manifestly excessive: Jones v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 471

in deciding whether sentence “manifestly excessive,” court to consider totality of sentences for total criminal behaviour—not primarily concerned with excessive starting point, though inevitably likely to affect final sentence: Le Gallez v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2013 GLR N [2]

leave to appeal out of time against sentence refused if sentence not manifestly excessive, no substantial grounds for delay in making application and no interference with applicant’s European Convention rights: In re Sherry (Royal Ct.), 2011–12 GLR N [12]

life sentence—court to make defendant aware if considering discretionary life sentence so that defendant may make relevant submissions—not following this procedure not of itself ground of appeal against life sentence, but may lead to other grounds of appeal: Burton v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 438

no necessary reduction in final sentence on appeal if court initially selects wrong custodial sentencing band and starting point, if original sentence not manifestly excessive: Law Officers v. Grunte (C.A.), 2005–06 GLR N [9]

no necessary reduction in sentence if full, one-third reduction for guilty plea not applied—court may apply smaller discount, e.g. if convincing evidence against offender leaves little alternative to guilty plea, violent struggle on arrest, and rare offence warranting deterrent element in sentence: Duncombe v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR N [8]

no reduction in sentence if not wrong in principle or manifestly excessive and any disparity between sentences for different offenders justified: Richards v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2000–02 GLR 247

not unfair to sentence defendant with only seven of nine trial Jurats present: Jones v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2016 GLR 243

not unfair to sentence on basis of facts found by majority verdict at trial—if Jurats gave no reasons for conviction, sentence not unfair if basis clear: Jones v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2016 GLR 243

Royal Court has inherent jurisdiction to remedy previous sentencing errors, even if made many years previously, but error to be plainly established: In re Sherry (Royal Ct.), 2011–12 GLR N [12]

assault on police officer. See POLICE (Assault on police officer—sentence)

burglary. See Sentence—sentencing principles. CRIMINAL LAW (Burglary)

child pornography. See Sentence—forfeiture. CRIMINAL LAW (Indecent photographs of children—sentence)

co-accused

disparity between sentences

no necessary reduction in sentence because co-offender receives comparatively light sentence as result of serious misstatement of facts of offence not then corrected—whether right-thinking members of public, with full knowledge of all relevant facts, would conclude defendant should not benefit from good fortune of gross error resulting in comparatively light sentence in another case, even if cases related: Law Officers v. Pang (Royal Ct.), 2003–04 GLR N [23]

same starting point for co-accused may be appropriate, but no disparity if uncooperative first offender receives longer sentence than co-operative co-accused with criminal record who pleads guilty at earliest opportunity and asks for further offences to be considered: Bryant v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR N [11]

test whether right-thinking members of public aware of disparity would think something had gone wrong with administration of justice: Barras v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2021 GLR 372

test whether right-thinking members of public aware of disparity would think something had gone wrong with administration of justice—examples given of factors justifying or not justifying disparity: Bond v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2003–04 GLR N [6]

same starting point appropriate for co-accused if no differentiation in culpability in planning and executing offence—no disparity in principle between sentences if other co-accused receive 5 years after guilty pleas and mitigation and appellant receives 8½ years after not guilty plea and mitigation: George v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2007–08 GLR N [10]

commencement of sentence. See ROAD TRAFFIC (Disqualification from driving—commencement of disqualification)

common design. See Sentence—multiple offenders

concurrent and consecutive sentences

child pornography—multiple offences involving different seriousness—proper to increase sentence for most serious offence and pass concurrent sentences on convictions for lesser offences—in appropriate case, short separate consecutive sentence permissible for lesser offence: Le Gallez v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2013 GLR N [2]

consecutive sentences for offences arising out of same incident exceptionally justified if court wishes to stress seriousness of type of crime, e.g. use of knife in assault in public place: Pirito v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2007–08 GLR N [21]

consecutive sentences for offences arising out of same incident not normally justified but may be appropriate if (a) court wishes to emphasize importance of each offence, so that concurrency of sentences not regarded by offender as equivalent to permission to repeat without penalty; or (b) required by totality principle: Collins v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR N [15]

consecutive sentences of imprisonment for separate and unconnected offences if each justifies prison sentence, provided totality not too great: Thompson v. Law Officers (C.A.), 1997–99 GLR 28

disqualification from driving—multiple disqualifications run concurrently—no statutory provision to order disqualification to take effect consecutively to another period of disqualification: Collins v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR N [16]

drug offences—may be inequitable to pass consecutive sentence for dangerous driving on driver of getaway vehicle in importation operation—driving-related sentences may be ordered to run concurrently with sentence for importation: Wickenden v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2005–06 GLR N [33]

drug offences—multiple offences involving different drugs—proper to increase starting point for most serious offence and pass concurrent sentences on convictions for lesser offences: Richards v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2000–02 GLR 247

no appeal against consecutive sentences where individual sentences correct and justified, correct to make them consecutive, and totality not excessive: Thompson v. Law Officers (C.A.), 1997–99 GLR 28

totality principle

aggregate of multiple sentences to be appropriate to offender’s overall criminality in context of available mitigation: Collins v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR N [15]

court to ensure that aggregate of sentences for multiple offences not excessive—if justice achieved, immaterial whether shorter sentences made consecutive or longer sentences made concurrent: Pirito v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2007–08 GLR N [21]

totality of 12 years arising from consecutive sentences for gross indecency with children manifestly excessive in context of recent Guernsey cases: G v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2013 GLR 190

confiscation order. See Proceeds of criminal conduct—confiscation order

criminal abuse of trust. See CRIMINAL LAW (Abuse of trust—sentence)

date of offence and trial

sentence to be passed according to provisions current at date of trial if less severe than those current when offence committed—never possible to sentence according to provisions more severe than those current when offence committed—offender committing gross indecency with child before 1985 (when maximum sentence life imprisonment) and tried later, to be sentenced under Protection of Children (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 1985, s.1 (when maximum sentence 5 years): G v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2013 GLR 190

deportation

balance to be struck between need to punish serious crime and deter others; and importance of relationship between offender to be deported and his family—interference with family lives of others also to be considered, such as impact of violent and degrading offences on complainant and her family: Pinto v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2013 GLR 83

balance to be struck between need to punish serious crime and deter others; and importance of relationship between offender to be deported and his family—more serious the offence(s), less likely that recommendation to deport disproportionate: Fernandes v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2014 GLR N [8]

correct approach to European Convention, art. 8 is to ask (a) is there interference with family life? (b) is it in accordance with law and in pursuit of a legitimate aim within art. 8(2)? and (c) if so, is interference proportionate, given balance between various factors?: Pinto v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2013 GLR 83

Fernandes v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2014 GLR N [8]

court to consider whether (a) offender’s continued presence to detriment of jurisdiction; (b) offence serious enough to merit deportation; (c) risk of re-offending—court itself to investigate potential human rights issues, e.g. disproportionate interference with right to family life, before making recommendation—fewer investigatory facilities available to Lieutenant-Governor considering recommendation and no right of appeal, as in United Kingdom—reasonable expectation that court’s recommendation will be acted upon with little further investigation: O’Dette v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2007–08 GLR 16

proportionality of deportation as sanction not finally decided by court’s recommendation—remains to be considered by Lieutenant Governor when appellant to be released—balance of circumstances may change over years, though child’s best interests always to remain primary consideration: Pinto v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2013 GLR 83

recommendation for deportation “manifestly excessive” if fails to achieve proportionate balance between offender’s Convention rights and factors in favour of deportation—“wrong in principle” if fails to consider material factor supporting Convention rights, or unjustifiably considers significant factor in favour of deportation: Fernandes v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2014 GLR N [8]

recommendation for deportation not technically part of sentence—appeal against recommendation nonetheless to be decided according to usual criteria for sentence, i.e. whether manifestly excessive or wrong in principle: Fernandes v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2014 GLR N [8]

recommendation for deportation not technically part of sentence—appeal against recommendation (purporting to be appeal against sentence) nonetheless to be decided using usual criteria for sentence, i.e. whether manifestly excessive or wrong in principle—judicial review test of Wednesbury unreasonableness inappropriate: de Sousa v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2014 GLR 107

where child affected by deportation, its best interests always of primary importance—court should obtain necessary facts but will exercise inquisitorial functions only rarely—heavy reliance on probation report but offender himself to give court relevant information about domestic circumstances and family life: Pinto v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2013 GLR 83

diminished responsibility. See CRIMINAL LAW (Diminished responsibility—sentence)

disparity between sentences. See Sentence—co-accused. Sentence—sentencing principles

disqualification from driving. See ROAD TRAFFIC (Disqualification from driving)

drugs. See Sentence—aggravation. Sentence—mitigation. Sentence—sentencing information. CRIMINAL LAW (Drugs), (Drugs—being concerned in supply), (Drugs—cultivation), (Drugs—importation), (Drugs—possession), (Drugs—possession with intent to supply), (Drugs—proceeds of trafficking), (Drugs—supply)

effect of parole. See PRISON (Parole—future of parole)

English sentencing guidelines. See Sentence—sentencing principles

English Sentencing Guidelines Council. See Sentence—sentencing principles

extended sentence supervision orders

by Criminal Justice (Supervision of Offenders) (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 2004, s.3(5), extended sentence (custodial term + extension period) not to exceed maximum sentence for offence for which passed—extended sentence of 10 years for gross indecency with child (with maximum sentence of 5 years) therefore invalid but valid for indecent assault (with maximum sentence of life imprisonment): G v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2013 GLR 190

extended sentence provisions of Criminal Justice (Supervision of Offenders) (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 2004 in terms apply to all offences whether committed before or after 2004—presumption against giving statute retrospective effect rebutted: G v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2013 GLR 190

not breach of ECHR, art. 7 to pass extended sentence of 10 years for gross indecency with child or indecent assault on child, for offences committed before 1985 but sentence passed later, since maximum sentence for both offences at time committed was life imprisonment: G v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2013 GLR 190

under Criminal Justice (Supervision of Offenders) (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 2004, s.3, custodial term and extension period to be aggregated—offender sentenced for offences under Protection of Children (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 1985 to 3 months’ imprisonment and 2 year extended licence period has 27-month sentence of imprisonment for purposes of Rehabilitation of Offenders (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 2002—rehabilitation period therefore 10 years: Sahara City Co. Ltd. v. Chiverton (Royal Ct.), 2019 GLR N [4]

extension of time for appeal. See Sentence—appeals against sentence

firearms. See FIREARMS (Possession and use—sentence)

forfeiture

forfeiture of indecent data on computer under Protection of Children (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 1985, ss. 7(3) and 9(4)(b) not to include forfeiture of computer itself or other non-indecent data—prosecution may have to separate different types of data before forfeiture, as statutory powers construed strictly: Wright v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR N [9]

under Police Property and Forfeiture (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 2006, s.3, order for forfeiture of computer used to commit or facilitate offence, includes forfeiture of data on it—failure of court to require return to offender of non-criminal data may make overall sentence “manifestly excessive” if has financially adverse effect on him under s.3(5): Wright v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR N [9]

grievous bodily harm with intent. See CRIMINAL LAW (Grievous bodily harm with intent—sentence)

gross indecency with children. See CRIMINAL LAW (Gross indecency with children—sentence)

guilty plea. See Sentence—mitigation

hospital treatment order

defendant with schizophrenia pleaded guilty to arson—high likelihood of reoffending and high risk of serious harm to public—court made hospital treatment order under Mental Health (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 2010, s.66 and restriction order under s.70—defendant to be admitted to Guernsey establishment and then transferred to England (under s.82) for treatment: Law Officers v. Goddard (Royal Ct.), 2023 GLR 1

imprisonment

allowance for time already spent in custody—if credit for time spent in custody before notice of appeal not usually given in 1980, no justification for extension of time to appeal in 2012 merely because modern practice allows credit to be given and 1980 procedure now seems unfair: Sherry v. R. (P.C.), 2013 GLR 64

allowance for time already spent in custody—under Court of Appeal (Guernsey) Law 1961, s.37(3), proviso (b), court may order that no part of time already spent in custody pending appeal should be deducted from it—no automatic deduction if application for leave to appeal dismissed: Brouard v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2014 GLR N [7]

allowance for time already spent in custody—under Loi par Rapport aux Appels des Sentences rendues en Police Correctionnelle 1939, s.5, sentence suspended until appeal decided—in determining length of imprisonment, courts usually make allowance for time spent in custody pending appeal, but may choose not to, e.g. if not taken into account at time sentence passed: In re Sherry (Royal Ct.), 2011–12 GLR N [12]

life imprisonment

court to make defendant aware if considering discretionary life sentence so that defendant may make relevant submissions—not following this procedure not of itself ground of appeal against life sentence, but may lead to other grounds of appeal: Burton v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 438

to justify discretionary life imprisonment (e.g. for rape), determinate sentence to be clearly wrong, offence to be sufficiently serious to support long sentence and offender’s unstable character such that impossible reliably to determine when no longer poses risk of serious harm to public—in assessing seriousness, court to consider all evidence concerning degree of harm to victim, level of culpability of offender, and level of risk posed to society by offender: Burton v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 438

prison overcrowding for executive to resolve—courts not justified in reducing length of sentence passed merely to try to help—would need evidence of nature and extent of problem, as well as likely impact of reduction: Reynolds v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2003–04 GLR N [5]

time in custody before appeal. See Sentence—imprisonment

indecent assault. See CRIMINAL LAW (Indecent assault—sentence)

indecent photographs of children. See Sentence—forfeiture. CRIMINAL LAW (Indecent photographs of children—sentence)

knife crime. See CRIMINAL LAW (Offensive weapons—possession in public place), (Robbery—sentence)

“manifestly excessive” sentences. See Sentence—appeals against sentence. Sentence—sentencing principles

mitigation

assistance to police

almost invariably, considerable mitigation for offender’s early and useful assistance in helping police prosecute others—one-half to two-thirds reduction in sentence normally appropriate for genuine attempt to help, taking into account quality and quantity of information supplied, willingness of offender to confront others and give evidence against them, and degree to which puts himself and family at risk by informing: Richards v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2000–02 GLR 247

discount warranted if offender co-operates with police, pleads guilty at earliest opportunity despite ability to raise defence and asks for further offences to be considered: Bryant v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR N [11]

drug offences

accused’s addiction to drug not mitigation of sentence for drug importation, but may support claim that drug intended for personal use only: Edwards v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2005–06 GLR N [26]

accused’s personal vulnerability, e.g. emotional dependence on co-accused, appropriately considered as mitigation of sentence for drug importation—no special rules governing such situations: Gallienne v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2009–10 GLR N [8]

defendant’s full disclosure to police of involvement in trafficking may be mitigation, but sentence nevertheless to be deterrent and to protect public: Law Officers v. Pang (Royal Ct.), 2003–04 GLR N [23]

defendant’s previous good character may be mitigating factor: Richards v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2000–02 GLR 247

defendant’s youth may be mitigating factor: Richards v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2000–02 GLR 247

discounts for mitigating factors not simply to be added together—court to consider totality of sentence in light of all circumstances: Richards v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2000–02 GLR 247

importation of drugs—addiction of accused to drug imported not of itself mitigation: Woodford v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2003–04 GLR N [3]

intention that small amount of drug for personal use only may be mitigation—large scale of cultivation may refute claim and suggest offender is dealer: Marsh v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2007–08 GLR 1

mistaken belief that importing prohibited drugs, when drugs not in fact prohibited, provides mitigation—no increase in stock of prohibited drugs on Island: O’Dette v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2007–08 GLR 16

mitigation may be considered in setting starting point for sentence for simple possession of Class A drug—detailed guidelines inappropriate for simple possession—fine normally inadequate and leniency justified only if possession of minute quantity: Bassford v. Law Officers (Royal Ct.), 2007–08 GLR 330

guilty plea

discount may be given for guilty plea even when conviction inevitable, e.g. if spares rape victims additional trauma of testifying at trial: Burton v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 438

discount normally given for early plea in discretion of court—no need for detailed regulation or analysis of practice as in England or Scotland—adjustment to be meaningful and calculations explained by court: Wicks v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 482

discount usually given for guilty plea at earliest opportunity—reduced or even no discount, e.g. if offender caught red-handed or little alternative, depending on circumstances: Bryant v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR N [11]

guilty plea always significant—generally, one-third discount from sentence starting point appropriate, especially if early indication of plea—lesser discount if no sensible alternative to guilty plea: Richards v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2000–02 GLR 247

no discount justified for guilty plea if accused caught red-handed or has otherwise no real choice but to plead guilty, e.g. identity not in question and offence extensively witnessed: Pirito v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2007–08 GLR N [21]

reduced discount (25%) justified for guilty plea at earliest opportunity if accused no real choice but to plead guilty, e.g. found in possession of victim’s phone and victim’s DNA in blood on accused’s clothes: Ryder v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2009–10 GLR 288

smaller discount than one-third (e.g. 25%) for guilty plea may be warranted, e.g. if (inter alia) violent struggle on arrest, defendant uncooperative at interview, and rare crime (e.g. commercial burglary) warrants deterrent sentence: Duncombe v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR N [8]

indecent photographs of children—appellant’s understanding that not to be prosecuted not significant mitigation: Mauger v. Law Officers (Royal Ct.), 2003–04 GLR N [13]

parole—no mitigation if UK-resident offender likely to be imprisoned in Guernsey, with consequent reduction of parole rights: Richards v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2000–02 GLR 247

rape—discount may be given for guilty plea when conviction inevitable, e.g. if spares victims additional trauma of testifying at trial—mitigating factors listed: Burton v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 438

money laundering. See Proceeds of criminal conduct—money laundering

multiple offenders

common design—may be inappropriate to distinguish offenders’ roles in jointly executed crime—if identical sentences generally appropriate, wrong to make sentence for dangerous driving for driver of getaway vehicle consecutive rather than concurrent: Wickenden v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2005–06 GLR N [33]

if several offenders acting together in pursuit of common design, e.g. gang rape and abuse of helpless woman, starting point for sentence also represents joint responsibility: Pinto v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2013 GLR 83

importation of substantial quantities of different drugs—proper to increase Richards starting point for most serious offence and pass concurrent sentences on convictions for lesser offences: O’Dette v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2007–08 GLR 16

Newton hearing

in determining starting point, court entitled to reject version of events as to quantity or type of drugs without Newton hearing, but hearing may be necessary if court not to proceed on basis of offender’s stated belief: Richards v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2000–02 GLR 247

Newton hearing not needed to reject defendant’s explanation merely because beyond court’s belief, in support of claim to mistaken belief or honest ignorance as to nature of drugs imported: Kelly v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2015 GLR 234

possession of indecent photographs of children. See CRIMINAL LAW (Indecent photographs of children—sentence)

possession of offensive weapons. See CRIMINAL LAW (Offensive weapons—possession in public place)

precedent. See Sentence—sentencing principles

previous convictions. See Sentence—sentencing principles. CRIMINAL LAW (Drugs—importation)

previous good character

good character taken into account in selecting starting point for sentence of accused pleading not guilty—not also to be considered as additional reason for making downward adjustment from chosen starting point: Pinto v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2013 GLR 83

probation

under Probation (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 2018, s.4(1), offender may be sentenced to imprisonment and probation order: Bogle v. Law Officers (Royal Ct.), 2020 GLR 218

rape. See CRIMINAL LAW (Rape—sentence)

reasons for decision

desirable that sentencing court explains reasoning, e.g. why particular starting point and sentence chosen, so offender understands reason for particular sentence and appellate court can understand sentencing court’s approach: Bryant v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR N [11]

sentencing court to explain calculation of discount for guilty plea for benefit of appeal court: Wicks v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 482

reception of English law. See JURISPRUDENCE (Reception of English law), (Reception of English law—sentencing)

remand in custody. See Sentence—imprisonment

road traffic offences. See ROAD TRAFFIC

robbery. See Sentence—sentencing principles. CRIMINAL LAW (Robbery)

sentencing information

duty of Law Officers to provide written responses to appeals against sentence—valuable for informing appeal court of relevant statutory provisions, case-law and other legal material: G v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2013 GLR 190

evidence other than defendant’s normally required to support claim to mistaken belief or honest ignorance as to nature, quantity or class of drugs imported: Kelly v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2015 GLR 234

inappropriate to suppress personal facts concerning accused by using formal admission procedure under Administration of Justice (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 1991, s.2 so as to protect sensitivities of members of public in court—relevant evidence and arguments to be publicly disclosed in sentencing process and made known to Jurats—procedure under s.2 to be used only in exceptional circumstances affecting public interest, e.g. national security, and never for matters of personal interest: Fernandes v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2014 GLR N [8]

report of investigation under Drug Trafficking (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 2000 may be considered in sentencing for drug offence even if contains material, e.g. admissions by accused, not adduced or admissible at trial—report designed to calculate benefit obtained by accused may incidentally yield information relevant to sentencing—report compiled to meet civil not criminal standard of proof: Reynolds v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2003–04 GLR N [5]

submissions by accused—court to make accused aware if considering discretionary life sentence so that accused may make relevant submissions—not following this procedure not of itself ground of appeal against life sentence, but may lead to other grounds of appeal: Burton v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 438

victim impact statements

court (a) not to make assumptions, unsupported by evidence, about impact of offence on victim; (b) to consider offence’s particularly damaging or distressing impact; (c) to ensure that evidence of effect on victim in proper form; (d) to approach with care evidence of victim alone; and (e) not to consider opinion of victim or relatives on sentence to be passed, unless sentence would aggravate victim’s distress or evidence that victim’s suffering much less than usual: Burton v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 438

no formal Guernsey regime for victim impact statements, but may be taken and used for purposes of sentencing if carefully and moderately stated: Burton v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 438

sentencing principles

deterrence—deterrent sentencing necessarily has greater impact in small community—important consideration in rejecting English Sentencing Council’s Guideline for money laundering offences in Guernsey and selecting own sentencing levels: Doyle v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2015 GLR 370

deterrence—distinctive position in Guernsey sentencing—likely that sentences (especially for crimes offensive to community) given prominence in local media with increased deterrent effect—greater deterrent effect than in England where size of populations and lack of national publicity likely to dilute deterrent effect: Wicks v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 482

deterrence—sentencing for first recorded firearms attack on police in Guernsey requires deterrent sentence in attempt to prevent repetition of offence in small community—likely that increased deterrent effect by sentence being given prominence in local media: Granger v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2014 GLR N [9]

Guernsey courts to determine appropriate sentencing levels for Island—may derive assistance from sentencing practice in England and Wales (or any other jurisdiction), but no presumption that should be followed: Leonczuk v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2019 GLR N [3]

Guernsey courts to determine appropriate sentencing levels for offences on Island—may then consider sentencing practices of other jurisdictions to assist in reaching final conclusion—wrong to treat English sentencing levels as correct for Guernsey cases of same nature unless significant difference in social or other conditions: Wicks v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 482

guidelines—by definition, only intended to provide guidance and not inflexible code—should be followed unless good reasons not to—after following guidelines, court retains limited residual discretion to fit principles to facts: Kelly v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2015 GLR 234

judicial policy-making. See COURTS (Role of judiciary—judicial policy-making)

public confidence—court to be aware of public dimension of sentencing and importance of maintaining public confidence in sentencing system—inappropriate to indicate tolerance for unacceptable level of “gratuitous and drunken violence” in Guernsey: Blumson v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2000–02 GLR N [18]

reference to previous decisions

previous sentencing decisions of no precedent value unless considering consolidated appeals and fully informed of relevant facts: Law Officers v. Ingram (Royal Ct.), 2005–06 GLR 194

wrong to try to decide whether sentence “manifestly excessive” by reference to unrelated cases—too difficult to discover whether aggravating/mitigating circumstances similar and weight given to them by previous court—public interest requires “correct” sentence—courts to avoid perpetuating sentencing errors by following earlier decisions without adequate information: McCarthy v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2007–08 GLR 414

sentencing bands

burglary. See CRIMINAL LAW (Burglary—sentence), (Drugs—importation)

drug importation. See (Drugs—importation)

rape—in absence of relevant Guernsey authority, court may consider English case-law and Sentencing Guidelines Council’s guidance for starting points and sentences—for multiple offences, guidance suggests starting point of 15 years and final sentencing range of 13–19 years for adult offender, but special local factors, e.g. size of Island and impact on local people, may justify use of court’s powers under Criminal Justice (Supervision of Offenders) (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 2004, s.3 to grant extended determinate sentence and licence period, even if young offender: Burton v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 438

starting points

attempted murder—15-year starting point appropriate for premeditated offence involving violence and lasting physical or mental harm, but may be increased by general or Guernsey-specific aggravating factors, e.g. use of knife and considerable aggression, lasting mental impact on victim, and need for deterrent element in sentence: Jones v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 471

attempted murder—court may have regard to English Sentencing Guidelines Council’s suggested 15-year starting point for premeditated offence involving violence and lasting physical or mental harm, with final sentencing range of 12–20 years: Jones v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 471

attempted murder—not necessary for court to define exact starting point if final sentence clearly falls within accepted guidelines and not manifestly excessive: Jones v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 471

burglary—6 years’ imprisonment appropriate starting point for commercial burglary if violent struggle on arrest and defendant uncooperative at interview: Duncombe v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR N [8]

child pornography—“initial figure” selected under Wicks guidelines subject to increase for aggravating factors—doubling initial figure for aggravation at outer limits of permissible uplift and any higher multiplier beyond spirit of guidelines: Le Gallez v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2013 GLR N [2]

child pornography—lesser offence of same nature may be aggravation increasing initial figure for sentencing for principal offence even though also separately charged: Le Gallez v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2013 GLR N [2]

driving with excess alcohol—starting point 4–6 weeks if immediate custodial sentence imposed (i.e. where guilty plea and no aggravating factors): Law Officers v. Hatwell (Royal Ct.), 2003–04 GLR 146

drug offences—custodial sentence to be starting point for simple possession of Class A drug, length to be determined by quantity of drug and individual factors, including mitigation—detailed guidelines inappropriate for simple possession—fine normally inadequate and leniency justified only if possession of minute quantity—1.1g.–2.5g. cocaine not minute quantities and sentences of 6–9 months justified: Bassford v. Law Officers (Royal Ct.), 2007–08 GLR 330

drug offences—desirable that Guernsey and Jersey follow common guidelines in determining starting points for drug importation sentences: Richards v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2000–02 GLR 247

drug offences—detailed guidelines for starting points for drug importation offences: Richards v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2000–02 GLR 247

drug offences—for importation involving “relatively small” quantity (i.e. between “very small” and “more than relatively small”) for personal use, starting point to be between Richards bands for simple possession and trafficking—evidence that drugs for personal use shown by comparing quantity imported with defendant’s rate of drug use, e.g. not unreasonable to assume drugs for personal use if 5.233g. heroin imported and rate of use is 0.6g. per day: Woodford v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2003–04 GLR N [3]

drug offences—if starting point already reflects accused’s involvement in offence, improper to increase solely because of previous similar offence, for which sentence already served: Hutchinson v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2003–04 GLR N [2]

drug offences—lowest starting point for sentence for importation of drugs not appropriate if importation intended for offender’s personal gain: Jones v. Law Officers (Royal Ct.), 2005–06 GLR N [27]

drug offences—multiple offences involving different drugs—proper to increase Richards starting point for most serious offence and pass concurrent sentences on convictions for lesser offences: O’Dette v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2007–08 GLR 16

drug offences—no general guidelines for sentencing for importation of Class C drugs, but maximum sentence 10 years’ imprisonment—starting point of 8 years appropriate for importation of 943.5g. ketamine: Lamb v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR N [24]

drug offences—no starting point required in sentencing for simple possession of drugs or for importation of small quantities for personal use—court to consider circumstances “in the round,” not treating as simple mathematical exercise based on weight but giving proper weight to circumstances of accused: Driscoll v. Law Officers (Royal Ct.), 2009–10 GLR N [15]

drug offences—previous conviction for drug offence legitimately used to increase starting point of sentence for importation: Hardy v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2013 GLR 127

drug offences—previous convictions for drug offences legitimately used to increase starting point: Law Officers v. Ingram (Royal Ct.), 2005–06 GLR 194

drug offences—Richards guidelines and Turner guidance to be followed, i.e. custodial sentence band for importation of Class B drug to be two-thirds of that for similar quantity of Class A drug—no new sub-category created to deal with new drug and revised guidelines rarely appropriate—synthetic cannabinoid in powder form treated in same way as other Class B drugs in that form: Hardy v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2013 GLR 127

drug offences—Richards guidelines apply to Class A drug in quantity of even less than 1g. if justified by strength, value and serious dangers associated with abuse, e.g. Fentanyl gel patches: Noyon v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2007–08 GLR 169

drug offences—Richards guidelines apply to Class A drugs imported in very small quantities (substantially less than 1g.) if justified by strength of drug and serious danger to illicit users, e.g. Fentanyl patches: Jeffreys v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2013 GLR 338

drug offences—Richards guidelines on starting points for importation of drugs applicable to conspiracy to import, even though no actual importation occurs—final sentence reduced if non-prohibited drugs imported in error—no increase in stock of prohibited drugs on Island: O’Dette v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2007–08 GLR 16

drug offences—Richards guidelines on starting points for sentences for importation to be followed in cases of cultivation of cannabis: Marsh v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2007–08 GLR 1

drug offences—same starting point appropriate for co-accused if no differentiation in culpability in planning and executing offence—final sentences dependent on pleas and mitigation: George v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2007–08 GLR N [10]

drugs offences—Richards guidelines not outdated and remain good law: Barras v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2021 GLR 372

English Sentencing Guidelines Council’s recommendations on sentences for violent offences not to be adopted because less severe than “Guernsey-specific” policies adopted by courts: Ryder v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2009–10 GLR 288

English sentencing guidelines may be considered in determining starting points, but not to be imported wholesale, since local considerations may justify heavier sentence: Jones v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 471

Guernsey courts may have regard to English starting points but not automatically to treat as appropriate for Guernsey—Island has separate cultural and legal heritage, social issues and criminal landscape—courts to select own sentencing policies: Doyle v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2015 GLR 370

indecent photographs of children—“initial figure” selected under Wicks guidelines subject to increase for aggravating factors—doubling initial figure for aggravation at outer limits of permissible uplift and any higher multiplier beyond spirit of guidelines: Le Gallez v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2013 GLR N [2]

indecent photographs of children—“initial figure” to be selected as starting point by court sentencing for child pornography—then adjusted for aggravating and mitigating factors, with discount for personal mitigation and guilty plea: Wicks v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 482

indecent photographs of children—lesser offence of same nature may be aggravation increasing initial figure for sentencing for principal offence even though also separately charged: Le Gallez v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2013 GLR N [2]

rape—16-year starting point appropriate for young offender committing multiple (attempted) rapes at top of scale of seriousness, using violence and causing considerable fear in minds of general public: Burton v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 438

rape—aggravating factors to be taken into account in calculating starting point for sentence for rape—aggravation if lasting consequences for victim and serious violation of personal security: Barnes v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2003–04 GLR 521

rape—aggravating factors to be taken into account in calculating starting point for sentence for rape—not to be treated as factors rendering offence itself more serious: Burton v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 438

rape—in absence of relevant Guernsey authority, court may consider English case-law and Sentencing Guidelines Council’s guidance for starting points and sentences—for multiple offences, guidance suggests starting point of 15 years for adult offender, but higher starting point may be justified for young offender because of special local factors, e.g. size of Island and impact on local people: Burton v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 438

rape—starting point of 6–11 years—aggravating factors (including photographing offences) and mitigating factors (including previous good character) considered in setting starting point—10 years justified as starting point for gang rape, multiple acts of depravity and abuse of helpless woman—if several offenders acting jointly, starting point for all to represent joint responsibility: Pinto v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2013 GLR 83

rape—starting point to include significant deterrent element: Burton v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 438

robbery—8 years’ youth detention appropriate starting point for robbery involving violent force, knife and injury to victim: Bryant v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR N [11]

robbery—starting points and sentencing bands from English Sentencing Guidelines Council considered but not adopted in Guernsey because Guernsey-specific considerations point to heavier sentence for offences against person: Bryant v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR N [11]

views of Royal Court important in setting sentencing levels within statutory maxima—independence of Jurats and election by community specially qualify them to reflect local concerns: Wicks v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 482

starting points. See Sentence—sentencing principles

totality principle. See Sentence—concurrent and consecutive sentences

unlawful wounding. See CRIMINAL LAW (Unlawful wounding—sentence)

young offenders

“glassing” sufficiently serious to justify custodial sentence under Criminal Justice (Youth Detention) (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 1990, s.2(1), even if first custodial offence—inappropriate to indicate tolerance for unacceptable level of “gratuitous and drunken violence”: Blumson v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2000–02 GLR N [18]

Sentencing bands. See Sentence—sentencing principles

Sentencing principles. See Sentence—sentencing principles

Severance of charges. See Charges—severance

Sexual offences prevention order

circumstances in which made

application of test in Criminal Justice (Sex Offenders and Miscellaneous Provisions) (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 2013, s.18 to result in prohibitive orders which are required, reasonable, proportionate and capable of being understood and sensibly enforced—no requirement that risk posed by offender imminent—public interest, not social benefit, to be considered: Law Officers v. Blampied (Royal Ct.), 2017 GLR N [13]

where court satisfied on balance of probabilities that offender poses threat of sexual harm to children or serious sexual harm to the public, order should be made pursuant to Criminal Justice (Sex Offenders and Miscellaneous Provisions) (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law 2013, s.18: Law Officers v. Blampied (Royal Ct.), 2017 GLR N [13]

Spent convictions. See Rehabilitation of offenders—spent convictions

Standard of proof. See EVIDENCE (Standard of proof)

Starting points for sentence. See Sentence—sentencing principles

Stay of proceedings

abuse of process

delay

no stay for alleged misconduct of investigating or prosecuting authorities unless abuse of executive power bringing administration of justice into disrepute—even indirect or improper motive in launching prosecution not necessarily sufficient to justify stay unless conduct truly oppressive: Law Officers v. Taylor (Royal Ct.), 2011–12 GLR 8

stay rarely granted (and hardly ever on permanent basis) unless abuse of process involves fault of investigating or prosecution authorities amounting to serious abuse of executive power: Law Officers v. Taylor (Royal Ct.), 2011–12 GLR 8

delay

delay in commencing prosecution not enough per se to justify stay and stay not granted simply to express disapproval of prosecution’s behaviour—rarely granted (permanent stay almost never) in absence of fault in investigating or prosecution authorities so oppressive or unconscionable as to be serious abuse of executive power, or cause serious prejudice to accused—preferable for trial judge to use discretion under PPACE, s.78 to exclude evidence unfair to accused: Taylor v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2011–12 GLR 81

Summons. See Charges

Surety for bail. See Bail—surety for bail

Suspended sentence. See CRIMINAL LAW (Drugs—being concerned in supply). JURISPRUDENCE (Reception of English law—sentencing). ROAD TRAFFIC (Driving or in charge with excess alcohol—failure to provide specimen for analysis)

Turnbull direction on identification. See EVIDENCE (Identity—visual identification)

Unrepresented accused. See Defence—duty of court to unrepresented accused

Use of screens in court. See Fair trial—use of screens in court. EVIDENCE (Witnesses—use of screens)

Verdict

majority verdict

conviction by simple majority of Jurats not breach of right to fair trial under ECHR, art. 6: Jones v. Law Officers (C.A.), 2016 GLR 243